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As the novel coronavirus spread globally, a growing public panic was expressed
over the internet. We examine the public discussion concerning COVID-19 on
Twitter. We use a dataset of 67 million tweets from 12 million users collected
between January 29, 2020 and March 4, 2020. We categorize users based
on their home countries, social identities, and political orientation. We find
that news media, government officials, and individual news reporters posted a
majority of influential tweets, while the most influential ones are still written
by regular users. Tweets mentioning “fake news” URLs and disinformation
story-lines are also more likely to be spread by regular users. Unlike real news
and normal tweets, tweets containing URLs pointing to “fake news” sites are
most likely to be retweeted within the source country and so are less likely to
spread internationally.
Introduction
As 2020 began, an outbreak of a new respiratory disease that would come to be known as
COVID-19 occurred. The disease was first reported from Wuhan, China on December 31, 2019
1. On January 30, 2020 the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak a public
health emergency of international concern. By May 7, 2020, more than 3,900,000 cases were
confirmed worldwide spread across 214 countries and regions, and 270,057 people had died.
Severe outbreaks has occurred in China, United States, and Europe.
1https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019
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As the novel coronavirus spread globally, a growing public panic was expressed over the
internet. We tracked this panic using Twitter. Twitter is one of major social media platforms
where users expressed concerns about the outbreak of this disease, shared purported preventions
and cures, discussed theories about where the disease came from, and how governments were
and should respond. A significant fraction of the information being shared was “fake” as noted
by numerous news agencies reports2. Online fact checking sites, like Poynter3, put up new
information each day about new disinformation stories. Our analysis of these stories4 showed
many types of disinformation stories: false preventions and cures, false claims about the nature
of the disease, false diagnostic procedures, false origin stories, false emergency measures, false
“feel good” stories, and so on.
The research community has frequently turned to social media to study the spread of in-
formation, disinformation and misinformation [1, 2, 3, 4]. Among the platforms studied are:
Twitter [5, 6, 7], Facebook [8, 9, 10], and Youtube [11, 12, 13]. Disinformation or “fake news”
has recently draw attention primarily in a political context, such as studies around elections
[14, 1, 15]. Bovet and Makse investigated 30 million tweets containing a link to news outlets
preceding the election day. They found that the top influencers spreading traditional center and
left leaning news largely influence the Clinton supporters, while top “fake news” spreaders in-
fluence Trump supporters [16]. Grinberg et al. found that only small portion of individuals
accounted for a majority of “fake news” sharing [14]. They also found conservative leaning
users are more likely to engage with “fake news” sources. “fake news” also emerges in infor-
mation about topics such as vaccination and natural disaster. Chiou and Tucker studied the role
of social media in the dissemination of false news stories about vaccines. They documented that
members of anti-vaccine Facebook groups tended to disseminate false stories beyond the group
through diverse media. Gupta et al. in a study of fake images during Hurricane Sandy[17] found
that the top thirty users resulted in 90% of retweets of fake images. Most prior research has fo-
cused on specific users, with little concern for the type of user or their geographic location. An
exception here is the work by Babcock and colleagues that shows that disinformation spread by
celebrities or newsagencies has greater reach [4], and Carley et al. [18] that news agencies are
typically the most retweeted users, particularly during disasters.
During a pandemic, trust in health authorities is critical to prevent the spread of the disease,
to save lives, and to enable public safety. Misinformation is damaging and can even be deadly.
Because of the severe consequence, it is critical to understand the spread of accurate and inac-
curate information. A key problem in a global pandemic is that while these authorities, other
than the World Health Organization are local, information and disinformation is spread glob-
ally. Hence, disinformation from one country can undermine, even unintentionally, the heath
authority in another country. This may be particularly true when the information appears to
come from a credible source such as a newsagency or government official. However, little is
2https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/08/technology/coronavirus-misinformation-social-
media.html?searchResultPosition=1
3https://www.poynter.org/ifcn-covid-19-misinformation/
4https://www.cmu.edu/ideas-social-cybersecurity/research/index.html
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known about the spread of information, let alone misinformation, between countries. Little is
known about the role of types of actors, such as news agencies, in the spread of information
and disinformation particularly from a global perspective. In this study, we examine the global
spread of information related to key disinformation stories during the early stages of the global
pandemic. We address four research questions:
1. What types of users send influential tweets in this global health emergency event?
2. Who is discussing disinformation stories?
3. Where in the world are those who discuss low credibility information?
4. What is the global network for discussing low credibility information?
Data and Definition
Data collection
To answer these questions, we monitored conversations about COVID-19 on Twitter starting
from January 29, 2020 to March 4, 2020. We select a list of keywords to track Twitter’s real-time
conversations5. The list include “coronavirus”, “coronaravirus”, “wuhan virus”, “wuhanvirus”,
“2019nCoV”, “NCoV”, “NCoV2019”. There are 67.4 million tweets and 12.0 million users
involved in this time period. We recognize that most Twitter users are tweeting in English, and
that much of the discussion around the coronavirus early on, used the English terms if it was on
Twitter. Hence, we used these predominantly English keywords, and the WHO terms. Although
this creates a bias toward the spread of English tweets, it does pick up a large number of tweets
in other languages.
In Fig. 1, two red lines show the general trends for number of tweets and number of users
involved each day. The two blue lines represent the number of newly confirmed patients each
day in China as well as those outside of China reported by WHO 6. As shown in this figure, the
volume of tweets first gradually reduced as the disease was contained inside China. As con-
firmed cases spread throughout the world, the volume of daily conversation in Twitter soared.
By February 26, it was six times higher than on February 20 (3,904,293 v.s. 638,204).
To further determine users’ location, social identity, and political orientation, we also col-
lected the most recent 200 tweets and the following ties for each user who posted tweets between
January 29, 2020 and March 4, 2020. Among 12,047,990 involved users, we successfully col-
lected information for 11,951,739 users. These data are further fed into a state-of-the-art user
profiling system [19, 20]. Using this system we predict the users’ home country based on these
tweets with 92.96% accuracy. We classify users’ social identity into seven categories – news
media, news reporter, celebrity, government official, sport, company, and regular user. We also
predict users’ political orientation as liberal or conservative. We achieve accuracies of 95.4%
and 87.4% on these standalone test datasets for identity classification and political orientation
5https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime/guides/basic-stream-parameters
6https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports
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Figure 1: The red lines show the number of tweets and number of users each day. The blue
lines represent the newly confirmed patients each day.
prediction respectively. Because our identity and political orientation classifiers are mainly
trained on English users, we only apply these two classifiers to users whose major language is
English.
Disinformation story-lines and news sites
Following previous work [2] and [14], we define “fake news sites” as ones that “lack the news
medias editorial norms and processes for ensuring the accuracy and credibility of information.”
We adopt three lists of “fake news” sites as proposed in [14]: black sites, orange sites, red sites.
The black list contains a set of websites which published exclusively fabricated stories. The red
list is a set of websites spreading falsehoods with a flawed editorial process. Sites labeled as
orange represent cases where annotators were less certain that the falsehoods stemmed from a
flawed editorial process. We further add a list of news sources as trusted news sites. There are
20 black, 26 red, 25 orange “fake news” sites and 90 real news sites whose URLs appear in our
collected data.
To study the conversation around specific disinformation stories, we manually identified five
disinformation story-lines. The first is a popular conspiracy that this novel coronavirus is a bio-
weapon developed in a research lab. The remaining story-lines are about potential cures for this
disease – garlic, sesame oil, bleach, and chlorine dioxide. For each story-line, we retrieve tweets
4
Table 1: Number of source tweets and retweets with news URLs, overall and by story-line.
News Total Bio-weapon Bleach Chlorine Garlic Sesame
Source
tweet
Black 3083 92 (2.98%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
Red 53522 4,447 (8.31%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 5 (0.01%) 0 (0.00%)
Orange 61162 4,879 (7.98%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.00%) 10 (0.02%) 0 (0.00%)
Real 796071 1,245 (0.16%) 0 (0.00%) 13 (0.00%) 169 (0.02%) 18 (0.00%)
Retweet
Black 32302 73 (0.23%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
Red 151249 15,467 (10.23%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 2 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
Orange 205362 24,916 (12.13%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 11 (0.01%) 0 (0.00%)
Real 2738551 4,291 (0.16%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 205 (0.01%) 25 (0.00%)
by searching for corresponding keywords in our COVID-19 corpus. For this body of tweets,
we can say that they are discussing a particular disinformation story-line; however, at this point
we cannot say whether or not the sender of the message is knowingly spreading disinformation,
unwittingly spreading misinformation, joking about the story-line (satire), or pointing out that
this story-line is not true and so countering disinformation. What we can say is that they are
taking part in the discussion around that story-line.
We show the number of tweets that contain one of the news URLs and a story-line in Sup-
plementary Table 1 for original tweets as well as retweets. As shown in Supplementary Table 1,
most of source tweets with “fake news” URLs contain keywords related to the bio-weapon con-
spiracy. There is a high percentage of tweets both mentioning “bio-weapon” and “fake news”
URLs compared to tweets mentioning “bio-weapon” and a trusted news source. This suggests
that the bio-weapon disinformation came from these “fake news” sites. In the case of retweets,
a high percentage of retweets that mention red news or orange news sites also mention “bio-
weapon”. This suggests that these less credible news sites were critical in further spreading this
conspiracy; particularly as tweets mentioning black news URLs and “bio-weapon” were less
likely to be retweeted. It is likely that there are more tweets discussing these stories, than listed
here, as selection on keyword tends to under-sample.
Results
What types of users spread influential tweets?
There are 67,408,573 tweets posted by 12,047,990 users in total between January 29, 2020 and
March 4, 2020. Among 5,448,250 English speaking users, 28.6% exhibit bot-like characteris-
tics and behavior. There are 96.44% regular users (30.73% are labeled as bots7), 1.12% news
agencies (32.91% of which are bots), 1.18% news reporters (18.04% of which are bots), and
1.05% government officials (19.94% of which are bots). Only 0.15% of users are company
7We use bothunter with a 60% cutoff which has a precision of .957 and a recall of .704. [21, 22, 23]
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accounts and the rest appear to be celebrities. As companies and celebrities together make up
less than 1% of the users, we do not continue to analyze these groups in this paper.
Figure 2: Two bar charts show identity distributions across top influential tweets. There are
20 bars in the left figure, each of which represents the identity distribution of source users of
100 tweeters. The leftmost bar is for the top 100 most retweeted tweets. From left to right, the
number of retweets decrease. The right figure contains 50 bars. Each bar shows the identity dis-
tribution of 10000 tweeters. The leftmost bar is the identity distribution for the most retweeted
10000 tweets.
We define influential tweets as those which were the most retweeted. For these influential
tweets, we identify the type of user (identity) mainly tweeting in English that posted it. In Fig.
2, two bar charts show the identity distribution across these most widely spread tweets. As
expected, news medias play an important role in this event. 25.98% and 12.38% of top 10000
most influential tweets are posted by news agencies and individual news reporters. Government
officials also contribute 8.79% of these 10000 influential tweets. Even though less than 5%
of users are these official accounts, they contribute more than 50% of these top 10000 tweets.
Regular users posted 48.29% of these influential tweets. The percentage is relatively small
considering more than 95% of the users are regular users. A deeper dive into these top 100
most influential tweets, shows that 90% of the tweets are posted by regular users. Thus there is
a curvilinear relationship with influence such that low influence and super high influence tweets
are posted by regular users; whereas highly influential tweets are posted by news agencies and
government officials.
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What types of users cite “fake news” sites or discuss disinformation story-
lines?
To study the identity of users who are talking about “fake news” URLs, we first retrieve all the
tweets that contained a URL to a news site (fake or real), then we apply our user profiling system
to these users. In total, there are 3085 source tweets containing black news URLs, 53531 source
tweets containing red news URLs, and 61179 source tweets containing orange news URLs, and
796267 containing real news URLs. The number of retweets containing such URLs are 32305
(black), 151286 (red), 205409 (orange), and 2739257 (real).
In Table 2, we listed the number of tweets by each type of user that contain a URL to a news
site by level of credibility. As shown in this table, news sites with different levels of credibility
attract different types of users (χ2 = 8832.1, p < 0.001, df = 18). About 90% of the tweets
containing these “fake news” URLs are initiated by regular users. Most of those tweets contain
links to red or orange sites. In contrast, the real news sites are linked to by governments and
individual news reporters.
We also show the percentage of tweets sent by each type of user with bot-like behavior by
levels of credibility in Table 2. We find that the lower the credibility of the news site being
linked to, the more likely the sender of the tweet is a bot. For example, 58.74% of the source
users sending a URL for a black news site appear to be bots as shown in Fig. 3. A majority
of retweeters of black sites are predicted as bot accounts, which indicates that a large group of
automatically operated accounts are trying to promote these news. We also note that some of
the news agencies, government and news reporter users appear to be bots. None of the accounts
labeled as possible bots are verified accounts. There are several possible reasons for this: a)
there are news bots and propaganda bots that are employed by some news agencies and various
official account, b) an account where multiple people send out the tweets can appear as a bot,
and c) despite 95.7% precision the bot-hunter program may be making errors. Nonetheless,
the results suggest that there may be a set of bots that were established precisely to spread
information from the less credible sites - particularly the black news sites.
Table 2: Number of tweets by each type of user that contain a URL to a news site by levels of
credibility. Number in parentheses represents the percentage of tweets by each type of user that
also have bot-like behavior, e.g. among 2090 tweets citing black news by regular users, 71.15%
of them are posted by bot-like accounts.
Regular News agency Government News reporter
Black news 2,090 (71.15%) 409 (88.26%) 36 (80.56%) 27 (77.78%)
Red news 45,200 (66.74%) 3,155 (85.93%) 490 (60.00%) 357 (63.03%)
Orange news 45,503 (55.59%) 4,260 (56.15%) 821 (71.13%) 634 (46.53%)
Real news 509,188 (47.62%) 68,044 (61.19%) 15,430 (36.42%) 45,547 (23.96%)
What types of users are discussing the disinformation story-lines varies by story-line (χ2 =
5233.8, p < 0.001, df = 30) as can be seen in Table 3. The bio-weapon conspiracy is the most
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Figure 3: Percentage of bot-like source users and retweeters who share news URLs (top). Per-
centage of bot-like source users and retweeters who talked about misinformation (bottom).
widely spread story-line as 34,301 unique users tweet about this story. Bleach is the most pop-
ular story-line concerning a false cure. A manual examination of the content of bleach tweets,
showed that many of them appeared to be jokes or satirical responses to the original disinfor-
mation story. Fewer regular users spread the remaining story-lines. Many news agencies and
government officials such as WHO are sending tweets trying to refute the original disinforma-
tion story-line.
In many cases, though, it appears that it is bots sending tweets regarding these disinforma-
tion story-lines. In Table 3 we see that there is not a simple pattern to the bot activity. We do
find that there are more bot-like users spreading the bio-weapon story-line. This suggest that a
set of bots may have been established to mimic authoritative sites to spread this information.
For the political orientation, Fig. 4 shows most people who tweet and retweet “fake news”
URL are more leaning towards conservative users. 33.28% of people tweeting real news URLs
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Table 3: Number of tweets by each type of user that mention one of the story-lines. Number
if parentheses represents percentage of tweets by each type of user with bot-like behavior that
contain one of the story-lines, e.g. among 45,791 tweets mentioning bio-weapon by regular
users, 47.07% of them are posted by bot-like accounts.
Misinformation Regular News agency Government News reporter
Bio-weapon 45,791 (47.07%) 1,956 (68.71%) 842 (70.07%) 1,192 (71.47%)
Bleach 5,826 (42.76%) 280 (47.86%) 72 (36.11%) 142 (21.83%)
Chlorine dioxide 262 (35.11%) 58 (22.41%) 4 (50.00%) 5 (60.00%)
Garlic 2,316 (40.85%) 385 (56.62%) 79 (29.11%) 100 (28.00%)
Sesame 279 (38.71%) 33 (66.67%) 27 (22.22%) 22 (18.18%)
All tweets 6,516,340 (42.35%) 1,102,842 (59.75%) 185,731 (39.01%) 263,939 (26.55%)
are labeled as conservative users, while 82.45% of people sharing “fake news” URLs are labeled
conservative users. For each misinformation story, the percentage varies case by case. The
widely spread bio-weapon story tends to attract a higher percentage of conservative users than
liberal users. For the other cure stories, most of users discussing them are labeled as liberal
users. Interestingly, even though chlorine dioxide is one kind of bleach, people who tweet
about chlorine dioxide differ significantly from the bleach case, and the tweets are less likely to
be jokes.
Where in the world are those who discuss low credibility information?
To measure users’ geographical distribution, we combine geotags in user timelines with our
country-level location predictions. For each user collected with timeline data, we look at the
geotag in each tweet. Among 11,951,739 users, there are 791,830 individuals with geotags in
their timelines. The home country of these geotagged users is determined by a majority vote
of these geotags. For the remaining users, we apply our country-level location predictor to get
their home countries.
Because these news lists are mainly compiled by English speakers, we only measured the
country distributions among English speaking users to avoid potential language bias. As shown
in Table 4, United States, United Kingdom, and Canada are the three countries from which most
tweets with “fake news” URLs originate. Because of the language bias, there are many more
tweets mentioning “fake news” and misinformation stories from countries mainly speaking in
English such as United States and United Kingdom. 73.26% of the English speakers who posted
tweets with “fake news” URLs came from United States. The percentage is also much higher
than the U.S. users who posted real news URLs. To partially control for this bias, we normalize
the number of users sharing “fake news” URLs by the total number of users in each country.
The last column of Table 4 shows the normalized results. The probability for each U.S. user
posting a “fake news” URL is 2.28%, while the probabilities for Philippines and Malaysia are
0.13% and 0.17%. Even though many users in United Kingdom shared “fake news” URLs,
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Figure 4: Percentage of conservative source users and retweeters who share news URLs (top).
Percentage of conservative source users and retweeters who talked about misinformation (bot-
tom).
the normalized number is much lower than countries like the United States and Canada. Users
mentioning “fake news” URLs are more different from the underlying population than users
mentioning real news. We use KL-divergence to measure the distance from country distribution
of source users posting “fake news” URLs to the country distribution of all English sources.
The distance is 0.144 in this case. On the contrary, the KL-divergence from country distribution
of sources posting real news URLs to the country distribution of English sources is only 0.075.
In Table 5, we also show the country distribution for users who retweet these “fake news”
URLs. Again, a majority of retweeters are from the United States, followed by the United
Kingdom and Canada. After we normalize the number of retweeters of “fake news” URLs by
the total number of retweeters in each country, we can see that 3.79% of users in United States
have at least retweeted one tweet with “fake news” URLs, which is much higher than the average
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Table 4: Country distribution of English speaking users who posted tweets with news URLs.
We only show top 10 countries with the most English source users in this table.
Country/region
# of EN users posting
“fake news” URLs
# of EN users posting
real news URLs # of EN source users
% of EN users posting
“fake news” URLs per country
United States 24,552 (73.26%) 146,875 (64.11%) 1,077,431 (51.55%) 2.28%
United Kingdom 2,599 (7.75%) 23,988 (10.47%) 255,779 (12.24%) 1.02%
Philippines 112 (0.33%) 2,483 (1.08%) 89,480 (4.28%) 0.13%
India 334 (1.00%) 4,674 (2.04%) 83,030 (3.97%) 0.40%
Canada 1,368 (4.08%) 10,228 (4.46%) 77,344 (3.70%) 1.77%
Nigeria 677 (2.02%) 1,263 (0.55%) 59,862 (2.86%) 1.13%
Australia 607 (1.81%) 6,755 (2.95%) 52,526 (2.51%) 1.16%
South Africa 339 (1.01%) 1,261 (0.55%) 26,308 (1.26%) 1.29%
Malaysia 39 (0.12%) 961 (0.42%) 22,869 (1.09%) 0.17%
Kenya 83 (0.25%) 900 (0.39%) 19,486 (0.93%) 0.43%
total 33,514 229,111 2,089,892 1.60%
Table 5: Country distribution of English speaking users who retweeted tweets with news URLs.
We only show top 10 countries with the most English retweeters in this table.
Country/region
# of EN retweeters
of “fake news” URLs
# of EN retweeters
of real news URLs # of EN retweeters
% of EN retweeters of
fake news URLs per country
United States 79,157 (75.52%) 343,418 (64.18%) 2,088,187 (49.88%) 3.79%
United Kingdom 6,667 (6.36%) 49,222 (9.20%) 441,331 (10.54%) 1.51%
India 1,642 (1.57%) 13,277 (2.48%) 206,542 (4.93%) 0.79%
Philippines 241 (0.23%) 11,960 (2.24%) 204,856 (4.89%) 0.12%
Nigeria 2,953 (2.82%) 5,108 (0.95%) 135,306 (3.23%) 2.18%
Canada 3,586 (3.42%) 21,614 (4.04%) 135,083 (3.23%) 2.65%
Malaysia 380 (0.36%) 5,973 (1.12%) 118,361 (2.83%) 0.32%
Australia 1,393 (1.33%) 12,200 (2.28%) 69,699 (1.66%) 2.00%
Indonesia 98 (0.09%) 4,781 (0.89%) 62,147 (1.48%) 0.16%
South Africa 1,093 (1.04%) 2,875 (0.54%) 57,511 (1.37%) 1.90%
total 104,811 535,113 4,186,548 2.50%
percentage. Even though the United Kingdom has the second most English speaking retweeters,
the probability for users in the United Kingdom retweeting “fake news” URLs is still lower than
the average probability. Again, users retweeting “fake news” URLs are more different from the
underlying population than are users mentioning real news. The KL-divergence from country
distribution of retweeters of “fake news” URLs to English retweeters is 0.192, while the distance
from real news retweeters to English retweeters is only 0.096.
We have similar observation on the country distribution of misinformation, as shown in
Table 6. Most of users involved in the conversation about misinformation are from United
States, followed by United Kingdom, Canada. Among these top 10 countries, people from
United States, Canada are more likely to tweet or retweet misinformation. Among 1,077,431
U.S. users who posted tweets, 2.16% of them posted tweets mentioning misinformation stories.
And 4.49% of retweeters in U.S. have retweeted tweets talking misinformation stories. One
thing we want to note is that even though only 11,734 and 32,643 English-speaking tweeters
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Table 6: Country distribution of English speaking users who are involved in the conversation
of misinformation. We only show top 10 countries with the most English source users in this
table.
Country/Region
# of EN sources
talking misinfo. # of EN sources
% of EN sources
talking misinfo.
per country
# of EN retweeters
of misinfo.
# of EN
retweeters
% of retweeters
of misinfo.
per country
United States 23,234 (63.40%) 1,077,431 (51.55%) 2.16% 93,696 (67.54%) 2,088,187 (49.88%) 4.49%
United Kingdom 2,327 (6.35%) 255,779 (12.24%) 0.91% 7,484 (5.39%) 441,331 (10.54%) 1.70%
Philippines 1,142 (3.12%) 89,480 (4.28%) 1.28% 2,401 (1.73%) 204,856 (4.89%) 1.17%
India 1,351 (3.69%) 83,030 (3.97%) 1.63% 5,330 (3.84%) 206,542 (4.93%) 2.58%
Canada 1,541 (4.21%) 77,344 (3.70%) 1.99% 4,791 (3.45%) 135,083 (3.23%) 3.55%
Nigeria 1,080 (2.95%) 59,862 (2.86%) 1.80% 4,181 (3.01%) 135,306 (3.23%) 3.09%
Australia 879 (2.40%) 52,526 (2.51%) 1.67% 1,962 (1.41%) 69,699 (1.66%) 2.81%
South Africa 359 (0.98%) 26,308 (1.26%) 1.36% 1,539 (1.11%) 57,511 (1.37%) 2.68%
Malaysia 219 (0.60%) 22,869 (1.09%) 0.96% 2,009 (1.45%) 118,361 (2.83%) 1.70%
Kenya 341 (0.93%) 19,486 (0.93%) 1.75% 1,773 (1.28%) 39,558 (0.94%) 4.48%
total 36,645 2,089,892 1.75% 138,723 4,186,548 3.31%
and retweeters are from Hong Kong, 2.86% tweeters and 6.99% retweeters from Hong Kong
have tweeted or retweeted tweets mentioning misinformation phrases.
We plot the Kl-divergence between the country distribution of English speaking users who
share specific news and the country distribution of all English speakers in Fig. 5. As shown
in this figure, the population of who sharing real news is the closest one to the underlying one.
The less credible the news sites, the bigger of the population difference. In the bottom of Fig.
5, we also show the same plot for all misinformation stories. The country distribution of source
users who talked about the bio-weapon conspiracy are very close to the one of underlying
population. Among the cure stories, the bleach misinformation is the one spread most closest
to the underlying population.
What is the global network for discussing low credibility information?
An important question that has received little attention is how information about low credi-
bility websites and disinformation story-lines spread between countries. To examine this, we
extracted the information flow among countries. If a user in country A retweets a tweet posted
by a user in country B, then we add an edge from country B to country A. Figure 5 shows the
percentage of retweets between countries for tweets with “fake news” URLs and misinforma-
tion conversations. As shown in the above Fig. 6, 26.69% of users who retweet tweets with real
news URLs are from a different country than the source tweet. The percentage of inter-country
retweets is much lower for the tweets containing URLs to less credible sites, especially for the
black news sites. This demonstrates that tweets mentioning less credible news-sites tend to stay
within the source country. This helps explain why country distribution of users sharing these
“fake news” URLs differ from the underlying population.
As for the misinformation stories, tweets talking about bio-weapon, bleach, chlorine dioxide
are more likely to be retweeted by users from the same country. Tweets mentioning garlic
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Figure 5: KL-divergence between country distributions of EN users sharing news and all EN
users (above). KL-divergence between country distributions of EN users talking misinformation
stories and all EN users (bottom).
and sesame are more likely to spread internationally. One reason for this is that global health
agencies such as WHO posted several clarifications for these misinformation stories.
As a result, conversations about real news and certain misinformation stories have high
country diversity in their spread. Here, we use entropy of country distribution to measure the
country diversity of Twitter users who shared each “fake news” sites and misinformation stories.
As shown in Fig. 7, the country entropy of users who posted tweets with “fake news” URLs are
much less than users who posted real news URLs. The black news and red news are constrained
in the source countries. Similar effect also happens for misinformation stories. Tweets talking
about garlic and sesame are spreading as diverse as normal tweets, while users talking about
chlorine dioxide are highly concentrated in certain countries.
In Fig. 8, we show the information flows among countries. The width of a flow is propor-
tional to the percentage of retweets from country A to country B among retweets between all
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Figure 6: Percentages of retweets between countries for “fake news” sites and misinformation
conversations.
the countries. We only show information flows with percentages higher than 0.5%. We also
exclude the retweets inside the same country in this figure. As shown in Fig. 8a, United States
contributing the most of the retweeting flow between countries. Out of 11,092,477 inter-country
retweets, 4,034,985 are from United States (36.38%). A great deal of information moves from
the United States to other countries particularly the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. The
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Figure 7: Entropy of country distribution for users who posted certain “fake news” URLs and
misinformation stories.
situations become more extreme in the cases of bio-weapon (39,535 out of 69,389, 56.98%),
bleach (5,803 out of 8,144, 71.25%), and chlorine dioxide (292 out of 326, 89.6%). Switzer-
land, where WHO is located, plays a larger role in the flow of information about sesame and
garlic. For example, for the sesame story-line there are 823 retweets between countries, 415 of
them are from Switzerland (50.43%). All of these retweets are people retweeting WHO.
Discussion
This study investigated the discussion about the novel coronavirus on Twitter. We examined
“fake news” URLs and misinformation stories spreading in this emergence event. Our study
shows that news agencies, government officials, and individual news reporters do send mes-
sages that spread widely, and so play critical roles. However, the most influential tweets are
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(a) Flow of EN tweets
between countries
(b) Flow of tweets talk-
ing bioweapon
(c) Flow of tweets talk-
ing sesame
(d) Flow of tweets talk-
ing garlic
(e) Flow of tweets talk-
ing chlorine dioxide
(f) Flow of tweets talk-
ing bleach
Figure 8: Information flows among countries. Retweets from the same country as the source
are excluded in this figure. We use ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code.
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those posted by regular users, some of whom are bots. Tweets mentioning “fake news” URLs
and misinformation stories are more likely to be spread by regular users than the news or
government accounts. The distribution of users mentioning the URLs of less credible news
sites across countries is different from the distribution of users mentioning real news URLs.
More users mentioning these less credible sites and/or the disinformation story-lines come from
United States. Unlike messages that mention real news URLs or don’t discuss these disinforma-
tion story-lines which often spread between countries, these “fake news” discussions typically
spread within a country.
In this paper, we utilized machine learning systems to predict users’ latent attributes, such
as their locations and political orientations. Even though our prediction systems have reason-
ably high accuracy, they are still prone to prediction errors for individual users. To ensure the
reliability of our analysis, we have focused on aggregated results. For the same reason we fo-
cused on comparative results instead of absolute values; e.g., there is a higher percentage of
conservative users involved in the bio-weapon conspiracy tweets than in non-conspiracy tweets.
We also tested the generalizability of the machine learning systems on this COVID-19 dataset.
For the location prediction system, we re-trained it using the geotagged users in this dataset.
For the identity and political orientation prediction models, we extracted all test users existing
in the COVID-19 dataset and re-collected their most recent 200 tweets in this time period. The
testing accuracies for this subset of test users are 90.2% and 91.4% which are very close to the
performance 90.6% and 90.6% on identity and political orientation classification respectively
evaluated on the original dataset. In order to get a consistent evaluation on the political ideol-
ogy of global users, we apply a political orientation prediction system trained on users from the
United States on English speaking users globally. The political orientation prediction results
should be interpreted relative to the current conservative versus liberal differences in the United
States. We note that, to first order, these same differences are prevalent in Western Europe.
It is important to note that this study only extracted tweets containing certain types of news
URLs or certain keywords associated with disinformation story-lines. Whether these tweets are
being spread by those knowing they are inaccurate maliciously, as a joke, or simply to discuss
the inaccuracy is not considered in this paper. Future work, separating these tweets by the
original purpose could provide us with a better understanding of how disinformation spreads
during an emergency and the conditions under which it needs to be countered. Our search
criteria for finding tweets about coronavirus resulted in a bias toward tweets in the English
language. Our search was also constrained by the limits of the Twitter APIs. Hence, there
are likely to be additional conversations related to this pandemic that are not captured. Future
work might consider automatically detecting new tracking keywords in the streaming data to
dynamically shift the selection and so capture more conversations as the conversation drifts
between topics [24].
There are many potential implications of this study. We found that regular users sent the
majority of tweets referring to non-credible news sites and mentioning the disinformation story-
lines. Many of these regular users appear to be bots; however, most people cannot recognize
bots. Thus, people should be cautious when reading tweets sent from regular users, and per-
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haps be even more skeptical when reading those posts, than those from news agencies and the
government. Regular users in some countries appear to be greater consumers of information
and sources lacking credibility. This suggests that local country regulations, policies, and tech-
nology may be important in reducing the spread of such information. We found that health
authorities, such as WHO, played a critical role. Concerted efforts to increase the reach of such
authorities may be of value in combating misinformation.
Author contribution: B. Huang and K. M. Carley conceived the research ideas and experimen-
tal design. B. Huang performed data collection and experiments. B. Huang and K. M. Carley
analyzed and interpreted results. All the authors wrote and revised the manuscript.
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